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Introduction

Picture the Outlaw Inn in Kalispell, Montana, located on
Flathead Lake, the largest fresh-water lake west of the Mississippi
River, and situated less than fifty miles from Glacier National Park.
The July air is fresh and clean, and the big sky is postcard blue.
The mercury registers below sixty degrees and the humidity is no
higher than 30 percent. More patrons of the Inn sport Stetson hats
and cowboy boots than in any establishment outside of Texas.
Kalispell would seem an unlikely venue for discussing the minutiae
of civil justice reform and the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Yet, the Outlaw Inn was the site of the Montana
Bar Association's annual meeting, where federal court practitioners

* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Tracey Baldwin and
Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for
processing this Article, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. I am
a member of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the United States
District Court for the District of Montana; however, the views expressed here, and
any errors that remain, are my own.
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ventilated significant concerns about the new Rules revisions and
civil justice reform.
On July 14th, 1994, I participated in the meeting's Continuing
Legal Education Program on the 1993 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure sponsored by the Montana Defense Trial
Lawyers. One of my colleagues-who teaches civil procedure-and
I presented an overview of the Federal Rules revisions and how
those changes relate to civil justice reform under the Civil Justice
Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990. 1 The Chair of the Montana Advisory
Commission on the Civil Rules, which is the state analogue of the
Federal Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, then afforded the
commission's views on the . 1993 revisions and their possible
applicability in the Montana state court system.
That morning-long session warrants discussion because the ideas
expressed at the meeting provide instructive insights on the thinking
of those lawyers who work with the Federal Rules on a daily basis.
The attendees priJ;narily practice with Montana's large or mediumsized defense firms (comprising five to fifty lawyers). Some of the
attorneys were from smaller firms, and a few engage in practices
that do not consist· principally of defense work. A number of the
lawyers specialize in areas, such as Indian Law, natural resources
law, or water law, that require their regular participation in federal
court litigation. Therefore, most of the attendees had some
familiarity with the 1993 amendments and with civil justice reform. 2
Many Montana attorneys litigate in both federal and state court, and
that practice is facilitated because the Montana state courts pattern
their civil rules on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 In short,
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V 1993).
2. Moreover, the attendees-and members of the Montana Bar generally-enjoy
a reputation for treating other counsel with civility and respect. After all, Montana
is Big Sky Country where seldom is heard a discouraging word and the skies are not
cloudy all day. Carl Tobias, Justice Stays Civil in Montana, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 25,
1991, at 20.
3. The Montana Federal District Court is an Early Implementation District Court
(EIDC) under the CJRA, and its Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan,
which includes a relatively stringent provision for automatic or mandatory
prediscovery disclosure, has been in effect since April 1992. UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (1992) (implementing mandatory prediscovery disclosure),
reprinted in FEDERAL LoCAL COURT RUI.ES, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY
REDUCTION PLANS FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 575 (Apr. 1994)
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this continuing legal education program on the new amendments and
civil justice reform was probably typical of similar sessions held
across the country.

II. Discussion of the 1993 Amendments and Civil Justice Reform
My colleague and I presented a broad overview of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and civil justice reform. We initially
traced the historical background of the new Federal Rules amendments, and then considered the more important specific revisions
included in the 1993 package of amendments, which are the most
'
ambitious set of revisions ever adopted. 4
My colleague first lectured op. amended Rule 4, which governs
the summons and which was intende<;l to remedy certain problems
with the 1982 congressional modification to the pr9vision. 5 I then
spoke on Rule 11, evaluating the 1983 revision's complications-relating to inconsistent application, satellite litigation, and
chilling effects-complications that led to amendment a decade
later. 6 I focused on the major 1993 changes that provided safe
[hereinafter MONTANA PLAN]. See generally Carl Tobias, The Montana Federal Civil
Justice Plan, 53 MONT. L. REV. 91 (1992) (discussing aspects of Montana's plan that
may prove problematic and suggesting that some of the plan's provisions may actually
increase expense and delay).
4. See COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
FORMS PURSUANT TO 28 u.s.c. 2072, H.R. Doc. No. 74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), reprinted in Supreme Court of the United States, Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 402 (1993) [hereinafter Amendments] (proposing
comprehensive revisions to the Rules).
5. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-462, 96 Stat. 2527-29 (1983) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988));
Paul D. Carrington, Continuing Worlc on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 733, 733-59 (1988) (discussing prospects for the reform of Rule 4).
See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal
Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 844-46 (1991)
(analyzing nascent proposal to amend Rule 4); Kent Sinclair, Service of Process:
Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of Serving Process Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73
VA. L. REV. 1183, 1194-1295 (1987) (analyzing congressional change and suggesting
improvements for service of process under Rule 4(c)).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see also Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation,
37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 485-489 (1988-89) (arguing thatthe costs of the 1983 revision
of Rule 11 outweigh the benefits when the revision is applied to civil rights cases).
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harbors for lawyers and parties that file deficient papers and
entrusted sanctioning to judicial discretion. 7
We next analyzed automatic disclosure, a controversial discovery technique requiring that litigants exchange important information
before they may undertake formal discovery. We also reviewed the
amendments imposing presumptive numerical limits on interrogatories and depositions that can be modified with leave of court. 8 I
discussed as well the local option provision that permits districts to
vary all of these federal discovery requirements or to reject them
completely. 9
We then turned to the interface between the 1993 Federal Rules
revisions and civil justice reform as implemented in the Montana
District, which is an Early Implementation District Court. The
Montana District intentionally made its automatic disclosure
provision more rigorous than the Federal strictures; it demanded, for
instance, that litigants reveal the factual basis and legal theory of
each claim. 10 The court imposed no numerical limitations on
depositions, but the district considers greater than fifty interrogatories to be excessive unless their proponent can justify why the
court should permit it to serve more. 11
We also treated the Montana Federal Court's January 1994
Uniform Order, which was meant to accommodate certain of the
1993 amendments and was intended to be temporary, pending receipt
of the CJRA Advisory Group's suggestions for improving the civil
justice reform effort and the district's completion of its annual
assessment. 12 The court modified the automatic disclosure procedure to conform more closely to the federal requirements, while it

7. FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see also Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the
Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1775, 1775 (1992) (analyzing
whether amended Rule 11 is improved as applied to civil rights cases)
8. Amendments, supra note 4, at 449-50, 461-62.
9. Id. at 431, 449-61 (authorizing the district courts to make local discovery
rules).
10. See MONTANA PLAN, supra note 3, at 791-97 (explaining the automatic
disclosure procedure).
11. Id.
12. U.S. District Court for the District of Montana, Order (Jan. 25, 1994)
[hereinafter Order]; see also 28 U.S.C. § 475 (Supp. V 1993) (prescribing annual
assessment).
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retained the presumptive limit of fifty interrogatories, thus increasing
the federal restriction from twenty-five. 13
The audience expressed its concerns about the new amendments
and civil justice reform throughout the program. The participants
objected most often and most vehemently to the increasing complexity of federal civil practice. 14 Attendees voiced concern about the
growing numbers of applicable requirements that are increasingly
difficult to discern. 15 These requirements demand that lawyers
participate in more activities, such as special discovery conferences,
and draft more papers, such as documents certifying that they have
conferred with opposing counsel before filing discovery motions. 16
The lawyers concomitantly expressed dissatisfaction with the large
number of procedural sources, including the substantive and
procedural statutes in the United States Code, the Federal Rules,
local rules, local individual-judge procedures, local orders, local
unwritten practices, and civil justice expense and delay reduction
plans.11
Conversely, those attending the meeting expressed comparatively
little concern about nearly all of the substantive requirements
included in specific Federal Rules amendments. The automatic
disclosure revision18 was the principal exception; some lawyers
remained uncertain about precisely what must be divulged and

13. See Order, supra note 12, at 2.
14. See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of
Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1413-18 (1992) (arguing that the
CJRA further fragments an increasingly complex and nonuniform system of federal
civil procedure).
15. This concern is apparently a nationwide phenomenon. See Linda S.
Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 11 MINN. L. REV. 375,
380-81 (1992) (commenting that "[t]oday, federal practice and procedure is impossibly
arcane" partly as a consequence of the proliferation of local rules under the CJRA).
16. See id. at 392 (stating that the CJRA legislative history emphasizes "imposing
greater controls on the discovery process ... [and] reforming motions practice").
17. Tobias, supra note 14, at 1422-27; see also Mullenix, supra note 15, at 37778 (pointing out that a "federal practitioner must know, in addition to the Federal
Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, the existing local rules of ninety-four district
courts and eleven federal circuits"); 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. V 1993) (prescribing
procedures that districts must consider and could include in civil justice expense and
delay reduction plans).
18. Amendments, supra note 4, at 431-32.
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expressed concern about possible satellite litigation over the
amendment and potential expense and delay.
Finally, some attorneys indicated that the growing complexity,
cost, and delay of federal practice had led them to prefer state court
over federal court. An important irony of the federal civil justice
reform effort is that the endeavor has had very different effects than
those Congress intended in passing the CJRA; 19 statutory implementation has apparently increased cost and delay and reduced court
access. 20

III. Lessons
This examination of the Montana program on the 1993 Federal
Rules amendments and civil justice reform should increase professional understanding of modem civil procedure. The insights
derived enhance appreciation of numerous theoretical aspects of that
procedure and of the practice of civil litigation and have important
implications for the future of civil process.
On a theoretical level, the information reported provides a
telling snapshot of a procedural system in disarray, if not in decline.
A number of the 1993 Federal Rules revisions individually and
synergistically with developments in civil justice reform have
contributed substantially to the continuing disintegration of the
national, uniform, simple system of federal civil procedure that the
drafters of the original Federal Rules intended to institute in 1938. 21
Several 1993 amendments and significant aspects of the CJRA
have encouraged federal districts to adopt and apply local procedures

19. See 28 U.S.C. § 471(Supp.V1993) (expressing the congressional intent that
expense and delay should be reduced through the CJRA); see also Carl Tobias,
Improving the 1988and1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589,
1601-02 (1994) (discussing the motivation behind the enactment of the CJRA).
20. See Tobias, supra note 14, at 1426 (arguing that the growing balkanization
adversely affects the civil justice system).
21. E.g., Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732-39 (1975) (commenting that drafters
envisioned uniformity and cohesion in the structure of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 494, 502-15 (1986) (arguing that the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure intended to institute a national, uniform, and simple system of
procedure).
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that deviate from the Federal Rules or from provisions in the United
States Code. For example, the local option mechanism22 expressly
invited districts to promulgate and enforce inconsistent local
requirements and even to reject completely the applicable Federal
Rule revision. 23
The CJRA?s major purpose is to foster experimentation with
local procedures for reducing expense and delay in civil litigation in
all ninety-four districts. 24 The eleven statutorily-prescribed principles, guidelines, and techniques that districts were to consider
adopting, and the twelfth provision authorizing courts to apply any
other procedures that would decrease cost and delay, explicitly
encouraged districts to implement local procedures that depart from
the Federal Rules and United States Code provisions. 25
Once the national Rule revision entities and Congress had
stamped their imprimatur on inconsistency, it was predictable that
many courts, including the Montana District, would accept these
invitations. Indeed, the Montana court has relied on the CJRA to
institute a system for the co-equal assignment of civil cases to
Article ID judges and magistrate judges, although that regime
apparently conflicts with the provision of the United States Code that
governs magistrate judge jurisdiction.26 Montana federal civil
practice is additionally complicated because the judicial officers in
all divisions of the Montana District do not apply, or apply different-

22. The mechanism can be seen not only in Rule 26 (governing disclosure) but
also in Rules 30 and 33 (imposing presumptive limits on interrogatories and
depositions), Rule 16 (covering pretrial conferences), and Rule 54 (relating to costs).
23. Indeed, approximately 20 of the 94 federal districts now subscribe to the
Federal Rule amendment governing automatic disclosure. DONNA STIENSfRA &
WILUAM G. YOUNG, IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN FEDERAL DISI'RICT
COURTS WITH SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO COURTS' REsPONSES TO SELECTED
AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 (1994); Randall Sambom,
Districts Discovery Rules Differ, NAT'L L.J., at Al, A25 (Nov. 14, 1994).
24. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471473 (Supp. V 1993).
25. Id. § 473.
26. Id. § 636; DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, supra note 3, reprinted in MONTANA
PLAN at 575. The requirement in the Montana Civil Justice Plan that litigants request
timely reassignment or suffer waiver of the right to object to assignment to a
magistrate judge seems inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1988), which states that
the "rules of court for the reference of civil matters to magistrates shall include
procedures to protect the voluntariness of the parties' consent." Tobias, supra note
14, at 1417.
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ly, the co-equal assignment procedure and other important measures
governing pretrial matters, such as disclosure. 27
The drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules also intended that the
Rules serve as a model for the states, and they hoped that state court
systems would adopt requirements identical or similar to the Federal
requirements, thereby fostering intrastate uniformity and simplifying
the practice of law. 28 Insofar as the controversial nature of the
substantive provisions-including those in the Federal Rules
amendments and those adopted pursuant to the CJRA-discourages
states from subscribing to similar changes, this intrastate uniformity
is diminished and civil practice is complicated.
The new requirements for researching, writing, filing, and
signing papers, attending conferences (such as specialized discovery
sessions), and for discharging other, onerous responsibilities (such
as participating in alternative dispute resolution (ADR)) that the 1993
revisions and the CJRA institute have seemingly disadvantaged
attorneys and parties by delaying resolution and increasing costs of
civil litigation. 29 These demap.ds have detrimentally affected the
federal judiciary in similar ways. For example, courts' duties to
preside over a greater number of more complex litigation conferences and to rule on growing numbers of motions have apparently
consumed scarce judicial resources. 30
I believe that the difficulty of locating, much less understanding
and complying with, relevant requirements is partially responsible

27. Carl Tobias, Updating Federal Civil Justice Refonn in Montana, 54 MONT.
L. REY. 89, 92-93 (1993); Carl Tobias, More on Federal Civil Justice Refonn in
Montana, 54 MONT. L. REY. 357, 362 (1993) [hereinafter More on Montana].
28. Tobias, supra note 14, at 1394, 1397 & n.27; see also Carl Tobias, Public
Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 CORNELL L. REV. 270,
274-75 (1989) (arguing that the Rules' drafters intended a flexible, nontechnical
approach exemplified by open-ended discovery and liberal pleading requirements,
which transcend substantive lines); cf. Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American
Civil Procedure, 61 A.B.A. J. 1648, 1650-51 (1981) (explaining the debate over the
desirability of uniform procedural rules).
29. See Tobias, supra note 14, at 1422-23 (suggesting that the CJRA will further
complicate practitioners' duties); see also Mullenix, supra note 15, at 380-82 (claiming
that the increased complexity demanded by the CJRA will be especially detrimental
to lawyers and parties that are working under budget constraints).
30. Tobias, supra note 14, at 1422-23.
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for litigants' reluctance to pursue civil litigation in federal court. 31
Moreover, the complexity and uncertainty created by nonuniform
requirements exacerbates this reluctance. For example, anecdotal
evidence indicates that both plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel find
troubling the decreased uniformity, the increased complexity, and the
greater uncertainty of the federal automatic disclosure requirements.
Plaintiffs' lawyers specifically prefer to bring their claims in state
court because the simpler procedures expedite resolution. Defense
counsel similarly decide against removing cases to federal court
because of concern about cost, delay, complexity, and perceived
undue pressure to settle. 32 These problems adversely affect all
attorneys and parties, but they particularly disadvantage resourcepoor litigants-such as civil rights plaintiffs-and entities that litigate
in multiple districts-such as the Sierra Club, the Exxon Corporation, and the United States government. 33
In short, certain 1993 Federal Rules amendments-alone and in
combination with the CJRA and its implementation-have eroded the
national, uniform procedural system embodied in the 1938 Rules.
These developments have adversely affected federal court practice.

IV. Suggestions
This report from Montana is meant to serve principally as an
alert for those institutions that participate in procedural
policymaking, including Congress, and national and local procedural
revision entities, such as the Advisory Committee, federal districts,
and individual judges. 34 If lawyers who are members of one of the
most civil bars in the nation are expressing increasing dissatisfaction
with the decreasingly uniform, simple regime of federal civil
31. The material in this paragraph is derived from conversations with numerous
individuals who are familiar with civil practice in Montana and a number of other
jurisdictions.
32. The expense and delay of complying with procedures whose ostensible
purpose is the reduction of expense and delay are less than satisfactory bases on which
to premise forum choices.
33. See Tobias, supra note 14, at 1423 (discussing how problems can disadvantage entities that litigate in multiple districts and resource-poor litigants); Carl
Tobias, supra note 6, at 495-98 (explaining the difficulties that resource-poor litigants,
such as civil rights lawyers and plaintiffs, confront).
34. Tobias, supra note 19, at 1627-34.
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procedure, the federal court system itself must be experiencing
problems. Too many requirements, many of which are unnecessarily
complex and difficult to find, currently govern federal practice; thus,
lawyers consider state court to be a preferable forum.
National procedural policymakers should heed these warnings.
UnfortUnately, it is somewhat premature to posit definitive conclusions about the effectiveness of CJRA experimentation generally or
about the efficacy of specific procedures that have received experimentation. For example, numerous courts that are not early
experimentation districts have been applying experimental measures
for only a year, 35 and even experimentation in early implementation
districts has not been rigorously evaluated. 36
Nonetheless, it is possible to· posit tentative determinations
primarily based on the analysis of anecdotal evidence and annual
assessments undertaken to date. 37 The early data indicate that
Congress should probably allow the CJRA to sunset in 1997 as
scheduled.
The information also suggests that procedures which proved
·efficacious should be embodied in the Federal Rules, and that
Congress ought to provide for selective, additional experimentation
with promising procedures, while eliminating remaining experimental
procedures, especially inconsistent ones. 38 It now appears that

35. Numerous districts adopted plans only in late 1993. See, e.g., UNITED
. STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR nm NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, CIVIL JUSTICE
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. l, 1993); UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR nm CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CAUFORNIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 1, 1993).
36. For examples of districts that issued very terse assessments which included
no empirical data, see UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR nm DISTRICT OF
WYOMING, ADVISORY GROUP OF TIIE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ANNUAL MEETING
(Feb. 9, 1994); UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TIIE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
WISCONSIN, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ANNUAL ASSESSMENT REPORT (Mar. 19,
1993).
37. Most early implementation districts have performed at least one annual
assessment. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TilE NORTIIERN
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF TIIE CONDITION OF TI1E COURT'S
DOCKET (1993); UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR nm NORTIIERN DISTRICT OF
Omo, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DOCKET (1993) [hereinafter
NORTIIERN DISTRICT OF Omo ASSESSMENT]; see also 28 u.s.c. § 475 (Supp. v
1993) (prescribing annual assessments).
38. See infra note 42 (affording a recommendation for future experimentation).
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certain procedures in the broad areas of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR), judicial case management, and discovery will prove
effective. For instance, an early implementation program governing
ADR instituted in the Western District of Missouri has fostered more
and earlier settlements, 39 and the broad menu of options that the
Northern District of California provides has apparently facilitated
settlement. 40 The systems of differentiated case management implemented in the Western District of Michigan and the Northern
District of Ohio also seem to have expedited the resolution of civil
disputes. 41
The national Rule revisers should attempt to reinstitute a
national uniform system of procedure. Important to the attainment
of this goal will be replacement of the Rules' local option provisions
with a provision similar to the proposed 1991 amendment to Rule 83
that was retracted in deference to civil justice reform experimentation. 42 Equally significant will be the inclusion in a Federal Rule
of a single automatic disclosure procedure, as soon as ongoing
application and evaluation of the plethora of disclosure measures
presently in use indicates that one mechanism is superior. For
example, the Southern District of Illinois' disclosure procedure,
requiring that litigants exchange the names of individuals "reasonably likely to have information that bears significantly on the claims

39. See Memorandum from Kent Snapp and Davis Loupe to Judges and
Magistrates in the Western District of Missouri (Jan. 26, 1993) (on file with The
Review of Litigation); see also Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform in the Western
Dismct of Missouri, 58 Mo. L. REV. 335, 352-53 (1993) (examining civil justice
reform in the Western District of Missouri).
40. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL AsSESSMENT OF THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DOCKETS AND OF
THE CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN FOR THE DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11-23 (1993).
41. DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, ANNUAL AsSESSMENT 10-20
(1994); NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO ASSESSMENT, supra note 37.
42. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 152-55 (1991)
(authorizing districts that secure Judicial Conference approval to adopt, for not greater
than five years, experimental local rules that contravene Federal Rules).

THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION

218

[Vol. 14:207

and defenses, " 43 . has apparently been effective. 44 The Montana
District's disclosure' requirements also ·seem to have worked well
both in comparatively simple, routine eases, and in cases in which
the disclosure has been general. 45
Districts and individual judges should correspondingly be
attentive to the problems that local procedural proliferation has
created. They should abolish all inconsistent or unnecessary local
requirements, include the maximum number of remaining procedures
in local rules, and reduce to written form all local procedures.
Those responsible for state civil procedures should also attempt to
institute or reinvigorate intrastate uniformity and conform state civil
procedures as closely as possible to federal requirements.

V.

Conclusion

This snapshot of the 1993 Federal Rules amendments and civil
justice reform shows increasing dissatisfaction with the current state
of civil procedure. Entities and individuals-Congress, federal
judges, the Federal Judicial Center, and state judges..:_who have
responsibility for that procedure must act promptly and decisively to
halt its additional decline.

43. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TIIE SOUTIIERN DISTRICT OF IWNOIS,

CIVIL JUSTICE DELAY AND EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN 11 (1991).
44. John F. Rooney, Discovery Rule Lacks Unifonnity, Is "Source of Confusion":
Critics, Cm. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 23, 1994, at 17 (reporting that a majority of
lawyers surveyed in the Southern District of Illinois believe that the automatic
disclosure requirement in the Southern District works well).
45. The original Montana disclosure requirements were more rigorous than those
found in the Federal Rule; for example, Montana litigants had to reveal the factual
basis and legal theory of each claim. See supra note 3 and accompanying text
(discussing the Montana requirements); see also Tobias, More on Montana, supra note
28, at 363 (stating that "mandatory disclosure in Montana works best when the
disclosure is not complex").
Unfortunately, discovery poses the greatest difficulty and requires the most
effective reform in complex cases. See Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery
Refonn, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 263, 265-68 (1992) (suggesting that objections to the
automatic disclosure requirement of Rule 26 apply primarily to complex litigation).
For more analysis of disclosure, see generally Tobias, supra note 19, at 1611-16, and
Symposium, Mandating Disclosure and Limiting Discovery: The 1992 Amendments to
Arizona's Rules of Civil Procedure and Comparable Federal Proposals, 25 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1 (1993).

